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Commentary
The Case Against Brilliance
Daniel A. Farber*
In most fields of intellectual endeavor, the highest praise is
reserved for brilliant insights that overturn conventional think-
ing and common sense. Albert Einstein's theory of relativity,
which changed completely the way we think about the interre-
lationship of time and space, is a classic case in point. Econo-
mists and legal scholars, never ones to be outdone by "hard
scientists," traditionally have applied the same standards in
their own fields. I will argue, however, that "brilliance" should
count heavily against an economic or legal theory.' The same
traits of novelty, surprise, and unconventionality that are con-
sidered marks of distinction in other fields should be consid-
ered suspect in economics and law, in which thoughtfulness
may be a more important virtue.2 I will further suggest that
the current academic bias in favor of brilliant, "paradigm shift-
ing" work should be abandoned in favor of the more pedestrian
activity of "normal science."3
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Friends and colleagues
were generous with their time in reviewing this piece, but I will not embarrass
them by naming them here.
1. Of course, this does not mean that high intelligence or novel insights
are suspect in these fields. Novel insights often fill gaps in our knowledge or
resolve existing controversies, as opposed to overturning a view that was previ-
ously regarded as settled and noncontroversial. "Brilliance" is used here in a
restricted sense, to refer to new ideas that turn conventional thinking on its
head, as Einstein did to conventional views of space and time.
2. On the related issue of the relative importance of grand theory versus
thoughtful case analysis, see Frickey, Judge Wisdom and Voting Rights: The
Judicial Artist as Scholar and Pragmatist, 60 TUL. L. REv. (forthcoming).
3. Professor Thomas Kuhn explains: "'[Niormal science' means re-
search firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achieve-
ments that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as
supplying the foundation for its further practice." T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF ScIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
I. BRILLIANCE IN ECONOMICS
The Coase Theorem4 is an especially good example of a
brilliant, but practically limited, theory because it derives from
the boundary between law and economics. Before Professor
Ronald Coase's work, the accepted wisdom was that legal rules
could improve economic efficiency by preventing firms from
externalizing their costs.5 Pollution is a classic example of an
"externality," in that pollution victims incur costs that are
properly chargeable to a firm's activities. 6 Coase stood this no-
tion on its head, showing that economic efficiency may result
notwithstanding the existence of legal rules because people can
negotiate around these rules to reach the efficient result.7 For
example, even if pollution were immune to legal regulation,
pollution victims could band together and bribe polluters to
shut down. If the costs borne by pollution victims exceeded the
total benefits to the polluter, the pollution would be economi-
cally inefficient-but these are the very circumstances in which
rational victims would bribe the polluter to stop. There is a
tale, possibly apocryphal, that when Coase first presented this
paper at the University of Chicago, his audience was astounded
and was persuaded of his theory's validity only after hours of
argument.8 Since then, the Coase Theorem has spawned a huge
literature and has become central to much of the "law and eco-
nomics" movement.9
That the Coase Theorem is indeed counterintuitive is illus-
trated by its proponents' failure to apply it in novel contexts.
For instance, Judge Richard Posner-certainly a devotee of the
Coase Theorem 1 0-is also a leading advocate of the theory of ef-
ficient breach in contract law.'1 According to this theory, some
4. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43-44 (1960).
5. For the classic expression of this view, see A.C. PIGou, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932).
6. See generally Davis & Kamien, Externalities and the Quality of Air
and Water, in W. WALKER, ECONOMICS OF AIR AND WATER POLLUTION 12-21
(1969) (discussing "real or opportunity costs and the divergence between real
costs to society and real costs to individual economic entities").
7. Coase, supra note 4, at 1-8, 15-19.
8. See generally The Fire of Trutk" A Remembrance of Law and Eco-
nomics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 220-21 (E. Kitch ed. 1983)
(discussing the controversy surrounding the Coase Theorem).
9. The literature of the debate is cited, summarized, and expanded in
Coase Theorem Symposium, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 557 passim (1973); Coase
Theorem Symposium-Part II, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 passim (1974).
10. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.4, at 35 (2d ed. 1977).
11. See id. § 4.9, at 88-92.
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breaches of contract are socially beneficial because the breach-
ig party's gain exceeds the victim's loss. Hence, Posner argues
courts properly refuse to award punitive damages for breach of
contract because to do so would be to deter these "efficient"
breaches.-2 This argument, however, ignores the Coase Theo-
rem. According to the Theorem, if the law awarded punitive
damages, the parties would bypass available judicial remedies
and negotiate their way to an efficient outcome, just as in the
pollution example Coase used.13 Unfortunately for the Theo-
rem's advocates, however, such negotiations rarely occur in the
real world. Thus even for those who, like Posner, accept it
wholeheartedly, the Coase Theorem is just too contrary to com-
mon sense to keep in mind.
Although many scholars have attacked the Coase Theo-
rem,14 the best reason to reject it is that it is simply too bril-
liant. The reason the Theorem astounded Coase's audience is
that we do not commonly observe people behaving as the Theo-
rem contemplates.' 5 If we did, the Theorem would hardly be
surprising. No one, after all, would have been astounded if
Coase had said that pollution gets some people angry, because
that observation is obvious. Saying that pollution victims pay
bribes, however, is quite startling, because it does not really
happen.
This line of argument suggests not only that brilliance is
evidence of a theory's invalidity, but also that it is a likely cause
of its invalidity. If the idea that victims bribe polluters is star-
tling, people are not likely to think of it themselves; if they do
not think of it themselves, they are not likely to do it. If only a
brilliant person can think of doing something, it is unlikely that
12. Id.
13. See Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory
Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443, 1449-50 (1980).
14. See supra note 9.
15. See Kelman, Comment on Hoffman and Spitzer's Experimental Law
and Economics, 85 CoLUtm. L. REV. 1037, 1044 (1985). Professor Mark Kelman
has this to say about attempts to verify experimentally the Coase Theorem:
[The advocates of such experiments] grossly underestimate our pow-
ers of sensitivity and observation, the knowledge of our cultures that
we all should be able to gain by living within them. It really cannot
be difficult to comprehend that neighbors do not often explicitly bribe
one another... Living in our culture, we know something about the
attitudes of many of its subcultures, without ever explicitly defining
these subcultures in a way that makes them subject to scientific
study.
Id (emphasis in original).
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
most people will adopt that course of conduct. Most people, af-
ter all, are not brilliant.
Economics assumes that, by and large, people behave ra-
tionally, or at least that they act as if they were rational.16
Thus, when critics argue that firms are incapable of performing
the complicated mathematical optimization contemplated by
economic theory,17 economists respond that whatever decision-
making process they use, firms acting as if they were doing the
calculations will prosper and survive, while their competitors
will be forced out of the market.1 8 This response, however, re-
ally works against the validity of brilliant theories. If a bril-
liant theory is correct, but most people are unaware of it,
someone who finds out should profit handsomely. Thus, there
is a strong economic incentive for people to discover and profit
from brilliant theories-which of course will then catch on and
become commonplace. If the theory is true, then the market
has been overlooking a profit possibility. As Professor Milton
Friedman has pointed out, however, it is implausible that an
economist with a purely academic interest will find profit op-
portunities that businesspeople, whose very economic lives are
hanging on the result, have overlooked. 19 In sum, if a brilliant
theory is true, it should have been discovered in the market-
place; because it has not been discovered-or else it would not
now be considered brilliant-it is very likely false.
Examples of truly brilliant economic theories abound. Un-
fortunately, however, most are simply too brilliant to be true.
For example,20 Professor James Buchanan argued that even
16. Indeed, rationality has been said to be the core assumption of econom-
ics, distinguishing it from the other social sciences. See J. HIMSHLEIFER, PRICE
THEORY AND APPLICATIONs 8-9 (2d ed. 1980). For a thorough recent discussion
of the rationality assumption, see Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual
Decision-Making: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions
and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. (1986) (forthcoming).
17. See, e.g., Boulding, The Theory of the Firm in the Last Ten Years, 32
AM. ECON. REv. 791-802 (1942); Papandreou, Some Basic Problems in the The-
ory of the Firm, in 2 A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 183-222 (B.
Haley ed. 1952). The term "firm" is distinguished from "corporation" in that a
firm is a method of organizing production, see Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 388-89 (1937), and a corporation is a method for at-
tracting capital into the firm. The term "firm" is thus broader than
"corporation."
18. See, e.g., Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J.
POL. ECON. 211, 211-21 (1950).
19. See M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A PROVISIONAL TExT 146-47 (rev.
ed. 1962).
20. The presentation of these theories here is necessarily heuristic. See
Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1233 n.6.
[Vol. 70:917
BRILLIANCE
apart from interest payments, the national debt burdens soci-
ety.2 ' The older view was that because government debt was
money "we owe to ourselves," there is no net societal burden.22
Although Buchanan agreed that no burden exists when the
money is borrowed, he argued that when the debt is paid off,
taxpayers lose money but bondholders do not have a corre-
sponding gain.23 The reason for this anomalous result is that
the bondholders are exchanging one asset-government
bonds-for another asset-cash-of equal value.24  The idea
that a creditor gains nothing when a debt is paid off because
the debt itself is an asset that is simply exchanged for the pay-
ment is certainly a brilliant one.25 Only a brilliant economist
could come up with such an idea, and no one but an economist
would believe it. 26
Similarly, rational expectations theory contemplates that
the economic effects of any government action will be cancelled
by the rational responses of other economic actors. 27 If eco-
nomic actors are smart enough to cancel out all these govern-
ment actions, however, they must also be smart enough to
realize that the government actions cannot have any truly last-
ing effect. Moreover, firms realizing. that government actions
are always ultimately ineffective should have a major competi-
tive advantage, because their planning will not be distorted by
misconceptions about the economy's future.28 Given this advan-
21. See generally J. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC DEBT 31-
149 (1958).
22. See, e.g., 0. BROWNLEE & E. ALLEN, ECONOmICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE
127 (2d ed. 1954).
23. J. BUcHANAN, supra note 21, at 51-72.
24. For an explanation of the argument, see E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING,
PuBLic FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 406-07 (2d ed. 1983).
25. If this idea were true, a rational creditor would never be willing to ex-
pend money to collect a debt and would, therefore, save a fortune in attorneys'
fees. Such creditors would by now have driven their less shrewd competitors
out of business, so Buchanan's idea would be regarded as a truism.
26. Buchanan's theory does seem to suffer from a certain inconsistency.
Creditors are said to have no gain when they exchange an asset, the debt, for
cash. Similarly, however, the taxpayers should have no loss when they give up
cash but also cancel a liability that they collectively owed.
27. See G. SMITH, MACROECONOMICS 312-31 (1985); L. THUROw, DANGER-
ous CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS 142-72 (1983); Lucas, Econometric
Policy Evaluation: A Critique, in THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND LABOR MARKETS
(K. Brunner & A. Meltzer ed. 1976).
28. Again, these firms do not need to have worked out the whole theory
of rational expectations; all they need is the conclusion that governments are
economically powerless to help or hurt the economy. If the theory of rational
expectations were correct, this belief in government impotence would be the
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tage, these firms should dominate the marketplace. Thus, ra-
tional expectations theory, far from being considered brilliant,
would be nothing more than a cliche-if only it were true.
Finally, the theory of efficient capital markets holds that
private information does not really matter because it is in-
stantly factored into the market. Hence, the government
should not try to regulate various uses of insider information.29
A corollary of this theory is that stock prices take a "random
walk," so information available today cannot predict to-
morrow's prices.30 Because whatever information is relevant to
predicting future prices has already been factored into the mar-
ket by the actions of today's investors, today's market price
summarizes everything that is now known about the stock.
Again, investors who realize this fact should have a competitive
edge, because they would not waste time and money on fore-
casting efforts.31 This theory, like those discussed earlier, is
just too much of a surprise to the rational economic actors who
are its subjects.
The common thread in the above discussions is rationality.
It is all well and good for a theory about electrons to be a total
surprise to physicists. If electrons were believed to be largely
rational creatures, however, we would not expect to find truths
about electrons that surprised the electrons themselves. Most
social sciences tend to view human behavior as irrational, so the
fact that a theory is surprising is not itself suspicious, because
we might lack an understanding of the irrational parts of our
behavior. A claim that people behave rationally but neverthe-
conventional wisdom, and rational expectations would simply be a clever new
interpretation of a generally understood truth.
29. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 13-15
(1978); Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec.
1966, at 113. See generally Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Cor-
porate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985) (suggesting that government should
refrain from regulating negotiated stock repurchases).
30. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Sept-Oct. 1965, at 55, 57.
31. The theory of efficient capital markets, of course, employs some so-
phisticated reasoning and empirical data, which ordinary investors are un-
likely to discover for themselves. The basic conclusion, however, that changes
in stock prices are completely unpredictable, is simple enough. Investors who
trust entirely to luck, numerology, or astrology would have a competitive ad-
vantage over those who pay money to brokers, investment counselors, and
other experts. Hence, these "naive" investors should dominate the market.
Efficient capital market theory would then be a sophisticated explanation of a
generally held conclusion. In reality, however, the theory sharply conflicts
with most investors' view of the market.
[Vol. 70:917
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less are ignorant of the factors that make their behavior ra-
tional, however, is much more suspicious. Of course, it is not
a priori impossible that investors have all been unconsciously
acting as if they believed in a theory that economists them-
selves find startling and novel. Such a state of affairs is, how-
ever, rather unlikely.32
A return to the Coase Theorem33 may clarify how these
points fit together. The Coase Theorem explicitly assumes that
people behave as if they were rational. Two possibilities exist.
Perhaps people commonly bribe polluters, but until Coase this
fact totally escaped economists' notice. This seems implausible.
The other alternative is that people do not commonly bribe pol-
luters even though they would if they were rational. This,
however, is inconsistent with the assumption of rationality.
The core problem is that if an economic theory is true,
then people who behave rationally will act as if they knew the
theory. If people are consistently acting this way, however, it is
unlikely that the theory will be a surprising novelty. If people
are not consistently acting this way, the theory cannot be true.
Economics is a recursive science; that is, its subjects are them-
selves guided by economic ideas. The basic rationality assump-
tion of economics thus makes it unlikely that bad economic
ideas will survive in the marketplace.
Comparing this notion to a standard economic theory may
be helpful. Most economists believe that irrational employ-
ment discrimination cannot survive in the marketplace. 34 If
most employers irrationally pay women less than men, an em-
ployer hiring only women would have lower costs and could
drive its male-oriented competitors out of business. 35 Even if
most employers are irrational sexists, the theory argues, irra-
tional discrimination cannot survive the rigors of marketplace
competition. Precisely the same argument, however, applies to
irrational economic theories. Firms adhering to those theories
32. To clarify again, this is not simply the familiar argument that people's
subjective thought processes do not correspond with the economic optimiza-
tion theory used to describe their behavior. A startling economic theory does
not merely require that people behave as if the theory was true. Generally, it
also requires that they behave as if they knew the theory was true, even
though they do not. Thus, the fact that an economic theory is startling makes
it implausible.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 4-9.
34. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 352 (1981); T. Sow-
ELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 96 (1984); L. THUROW, GENERATING
INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 160 (1975).
35. See T. SOWELL, supra note 34, at 96.
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will suffer a competitive disadvantage and, over time, will be
eliminated from the market. Thus, the predominant economic
ideas in a free market society theoretically should be correct.
The case against brilliance is strongest in economics simply
because economics takes the most positive view of human ra-
tionality. If a theory is brilliant, by definition everyone in his-
tory prior to its discovery was systematically wrong about
something. The whole thrust of economic theory, however, is
against the likelihood of universal error.
II. BRILLIANCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Economics is not the only field in which brilliance should
count against a theory. Another such field is constitutional law,
in which brilliant scholarship has recently become rampant.
Because there are too many recent examples to discuss here,
two particularly brilliant theories will have to do as examples.36
First, Dean John Hart Ely argues that certain portions of the
Constitution, notably the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment and the ninth amendment, are
open-ended and have no fixed limits.3 7 Allowing judges simply
to make policy under these clauses would be undemocratic, but
to ignore the clauses would also be improper. Hence, Ely ar-
gues, judges should apply the clauses to strengthen democracy
by striking down legislation that in some way encumbers the
democratic process.38 This is Ely's famous "representation-rein-
forcing" theory of judicial review, so-called because the courts
reinforce representative democracy.39 Second, Professor Ron-
ald Dworkin argues that the open-ended clauses of the Consti-
tution are based on specific conceptions of equality, freedom,
and justice.40 In interpreting these clauses, however, judges
should not rely on the particular conceptions of the framers,
but rather on the deeper philosophical concepts that lie behind
these conceptions. Thus, in exercising judicial review, judges
should not be concerned with how the framers of the equal pro-
tection clause construed the concept of equality, or even with
how the average citizen today understands equality, but rather
36. As before, descriptions of these theories will necessarily be heuristic.
See supra note 20.
37. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30 (1980).
38. For example, Ely approves of judicial decisions requiring legislative
reapportionment, because these decisions strengthen majority rule. Id. at 87.
39. Id
40. See R. DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36, 226 (1977).
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with the true meaning of equality.41 Both theories take the
constitutional text as the starting point, but then add a brilliant
gloss of their own.
Both theories also share a common flaw, a flaw endemic to
brilliant constitutional theories. Most theories of constitutional
law rest on some notion of the consent of the governed, either
through tacit institutional acquiescence or through some kind
of social contract theory. A brilliant theory is by definition one
that would not occur to most people. It is hard to see how the
vast majority of the population can be presumed to have agreed
to something that they could not conceive of. Who would know
better than the average person what the average person has
consented to? How can someone have consented to a position
that is so novel and clever that only one person on earth has
ever thought of it?2
A homely example may help illustrate the point. Suppose
that Paul Pedestrian is a law professor. The Dean asks him to
teach Contracts next year. Paul has taught Contracts before,
using a standard Socratic case analysis as his teaching method.
Because that worked pretty well, and because it will not be too
much trouble to teach the course again the same way, he
agrees. Now two much smarter people enter the scene. Ronald
Dworkin argues that Paul's view of the course is only one spe-
cific conception of teaching Contracts. The concept of teaching
Contracts, however, really is more properly embodied in a dif-
ferent conception of the course, in which philosophical writings
are the foundation for the contracts course. Although Paul had
only his own specific conception in mind, he was really commit-
ting himself to the true meaning of the concept instead. John
Hart Ely then enters the discussion and points out that the
word "course" is inherently open-ended. The proper interpre-
tation, then, is "pedagogy-reinforcing." As it turns out, the
"pedagogy-reinforcing" interpretation of "course" requires
much the same teaching method that Dworkin advocates.
Let us assume that Dworkin and Ely are correct. The
problem is that they are much smarter than Paul Pedestrian.
If he had been as clever as they are, he would have realized
that his agreement to teach Contracts logically committed him
41. Id
42. Because constitutional law is not wholly wedded to ideas of consent,
brilliance is a less fundamental flaw than it is in economics, in which rational-




to a certain way of teaching the course. He was not smart
enough to figure that out, however, and in fact would never
have agreed to teach the course if he had realized what he "re-
ally" meant. In determining what Paul has promised the Dean,
it is useless to know what Paul would have meant, if he had not
been Paul at all, but instead had been someone else as smart as
John Hart Ely.43
To bring this example back to constitutional law, it is nec-
essary to make only two simple substitutions. First, substitute
the words of the fourteenth amendment for Paul's agreement
to teach Contracts. Second, substitute John Bingham, the pri-
mary drafter of the fourteenth amendment, for Paul Pedes-
trian.44 Or if you do not favor interpretivism, substitute the
average citizen of today, or a current member of the Supreme
Court, or a member of some oppressed class, or whomever else
you favor as the benchmark for constitutional theory.
A related kind of brilliant argument is to show that some
judicial opinion, or set of judicial opinions, has a dazzlingly un-
expected meaning. The most famous example is the attempt,
again by two brilliant professors, to show that Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,45 which
struck down the federal minimum wage for state employees,
really established a constitutional right to welfare.46 In defense
of this interpretation, one of these professors explains that Jus-
tice Rehnquist "seemed sometimes to lay the foundations for
precisely such a theory;" that some of the language of the opin-
ion "may be read to suggest" this theory; that the theory makes
sense of "an otherwise problematic distinction that persists in
43. If Paul had been as smart as Ely, presumably he would be the Dean at
Stanford and would not have to worry about teaching Contracts.
44. Bingham had a certain flair for sermonizing, but based on his public
speeches, it seems doubtful that he was as intelligent as the average law pro-
fessor, let alone Dworkin and Ely. For samples of Bingham's thought, see Far-
ber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendmen 1
CONST. COMmENTARY 235, 246, 251-53, 261, 270, 273 (1984).
45. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
46. See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of
'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181-92
(1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1065, 1075-76 (1977).
National League of Cities was recently overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). So far, no one has offered a
brilliant interpretation of Garcia, but presumably it is only a matter of time




the cases;" and that a tension in the cases "may well reflect an
unarticulated perception" or an "intuitive sense" that the the-
ory is correct.47 A footnote adds that the author doubts
whether any explanation for the decision based on state auton-
omy "can be offered along lines that both support the result in
National League of Cities and comport with the distinctions
drawn by the Court. '48 Only through this brilliant reinterpre-
tation, then, can the Court's decision be salvaged.
Of course, this interpretation was so dazzlingly brilliant
just because it was painfully obvious that Justice Rehnquist had
no such thing in mind. Indeed, the only members of the Court
who were remotely likely to be receptive to a constitutional
right to welfare were the liberals, who all dissented from Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion. Again, there is something inherently
suspect about an interpretation so clever that it never would
have occurred to the speaker or the audience. If Paul Pedes-
trian asks someone to pass the salt, one might argue that he
"really" must mean, "pass a healthful and taste-enhancing con-
diment"-a description that does not apply to salt, if current
medical theories are correct. So in some sense, what Paul "re-
ally" means is "pass the pepper." In the same sense, what Jus-
tice Rehnquist "really" meant was to establish a constitutional
right to welfare-which is, as the professors explained, what he
would have meant if he had been as clever as they were. But
he wasn't that clever, so it wasn't what he meant after all.
Still another, and possibly even more brilliant, approach to
constitutional law is to point out that Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion actually means whatever the reader wants it to mean. If
"pass the salt" can mean "pass the pepper," it can also mean
"pass the sugar," or maybe even "have some herring." As Pro-
fessor Mark Tushnet, an undeniably brilliant scholar, has
explained:
In a legal system with a relatively extensive body of precedent and
with well-developed techniques of legal reasoning, it will always be
possible to show how today's decision is consistent with the relevant
past decisions. Conversely, however, it will also always be possible to
show how today's decision is inconsistent with precedents.
..It turns out that the limits of [legal] craft are so broad that in
any interesting case any reasonably skilled lawyer can reach whatever
result he or she wants. The craft interpretation thus fails to constrain
the results that a reasonably skilled judge can reach, and leaves the
47. L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONsTrrTIoNAL LAW 312-13 (1978).
48. Id at 313 n.28.
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
judge free to enforce his or her personal values, as long as the opin-
ions enforcing those values are well written. 4 9
In a sense, then, Justice Rehnquist's opinion means nothing at
all, because a lower court judge is perfectly free to rule any
way he or she wants in any future case. Indeed, Tushnet has
come fairly close to saying that, in a capitalist society, language
is totally incoherent:
[C]ritics of unsophisticated textualism claim that radical indetermi-
nacy of meaning is, within a liberal community, inevitable. It is no
answer to that criticism to say that indeterminacy gives boundless dis-
cretion to judges. I agree that it does, but that merely demonstrates
the contradictions within liberal thought; it does not vitiate the
critique.
5 0
Thus, any interpretation of a judicial opinion is about as good as
any other.
This theory is brilliant because people seem to be under
the impression that language means something, so they are sur-
prised to learn that it does not. Still, if the incoherence theory
is right, it seems odd that no one has noticed. If the speaker
49. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretiv-
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 818-19 (1983) (footnotes
omitted).
50. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional The-
ory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 691 (1985). In his earlier article, Professor Tushnet
suggested that understanding any speaker is a Herculean, though not entirely
impossible, task:
Consider an ordinary conversation between two people. Alice hears
Arthur use the word "arbogast." She thinks she knows what he
means, but as the conversation continues Alice realizes that Arthur is
using the word in a way that comes to seem a little strange. She in-
terrupts, so that Arthur can explain what he means. But things get
worse. His explanation shows that his entire vocabulary rests on the
way that he has lived until that moment. Because Arthur's life is by
definition different from Alice's, Alice finds herself left with only an
illusory understanding of what Arthur says. Her task is then to iden-
tify the point at which she can, so to speak, think her way into Ar-
thur's life, so that she can understand what he means through
understanding how he has developed. In this story, "understanding
what Arthur means when he says 'arbogast"' plays the role of "fol-
lowing the rule in Roe v. Wade" or "remaining faithful to the fram-
ers' meaning of 'due process.'
Tushnet, supra note 49, at 825. Thus, to learn whether Justice Rehnquist was
indeed trying to establish a constitutional right to welfare, a full course of psy-
choanalysis is apparently required. Indeed, extensive biographical knowledge
is apparently needed to determine whether "pass the salt." is a request for salt
or pepper. (Recall that Arthur's "entire vocabulary" is under discussion here,
not just legal language.)
The reader who finds these portions of Tushnet's arguments bizarre
would be mistaken to dismiss his writings out of hand. When he is not trying
to confound common sense, much of what he has to say is quite insightful.
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BRILLIANCE
and the audience share a common illusion that a statement has
a particular meaning, the illusion seems awfully hard to tell
from the reality. Perhaps the audience simply lacks the bril-
liance to imagine all the meanings the speaker did not have in
mind. The same point can be made for the argument that pre-
cedent and valid legal argument can justify any conclusion, if
one is clever enough. Perhaps this is true, but because judges
are not as clever as the scholars who take this view,51 judges re-
ally are constrained by legal methods. Unlike scholars, judges
find themselves in situations where they can see only one le-
gally valid conclusion, because they are not clever enough to
see how all conclusions are legally valid. If this is true, how-
ever, then legal methodology really does constrain judicial deci-
sion making.52 Once more, we have a thesis that can only be
brilliant because it is actually false.
CONCLUSION
If these arguments are correct, then the standards for judg-
ing academic work in economics and constitutional law should
be reconsidered.53 Perhaps the current bias in favor of bril-
liant, "paradigm shifting" work should be abandoned.M The
more pedestrian "normal science, '55 may be the worthier
endeavor.
51. With unusual candor, a Minnesota trial judge recently acknowledged
that "[i]f IQ tests were used in grading judges, I wouldn't be a judge." Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune, Oct. 10, 1985, at 1B, col. 6.
52. Indeed, if legal methodology is defined as "the methods of reasoning
used by judges," then legal methodology actually does not allow one to reach
every possible conclusion. The arguments used must be those that judges can
understand, and this limits the range of conclusions.
53. Two caveats are in order. First, reversals of conventional thinking are
unlikely to be valid in these fields, but some exceptions may exist. Second,
this observation applies to constitutional law only to the extent that the schol-
arly goal is to interpret either the Constitution or the Supreme Court's deci-
sions. The common element in the fields of law and economics is that both are
devoted to understanding purposive human behavior. Psychology, on the
other hand, is much more concerned with irrational or involuntary behavior
and hence is more likely to find that traditional views are wrong. In those ar-
eas in which our behavior itself is nonrational, there is less reason to expect
our views of that behavior to be correct. A gap between rational purposive be-
havior and our introspective understanding of that behavior, on the other
hand, is much less likely. See J. SEARLE, MINDs, BRAiNs AND ScIENCE 71-85
(1984).
54. I once received a letter of recommendation advising me that a job can-
didate would do "extremely intelligent conventional legal scholarship" but was
"unlikely to be a paradigm-shaker."
55. See supra note 3.
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There is a tendency today for high-flying theorists to scoff
at those whose work stays closer to the ground. Icarus, too, was
undoubtedly scornful of pedestrianism.
56
56. What if, as several readers have wittily suggested, this Article itself
were found to suffer from the vice of brilliance? Would not its thesis then be
self-contradictory and, hence, necessarily false? Although clever, such an ar-
gument is misplaced. Even if this Article were brilliant, its thesis is only that
brilliant first-order theories about the legal system and the economy are gen-
erally false. Thus, the attempted contradiction fails at three points: (1) the
charge that this Article is "brilliant" is damaging but unproven; (2) the thesis
is that most brilliant articles are false; this could be one of the rare excep-
tions; and, most importantly, (3) this Article does not present a first-order the-
ory about economics or law, but rather a meta-theory about scholarship in
those areas. The Article's thesis, therefore, does not apply to itself.
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